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New Economy, Old Biases 
Nancy Leong† 
  INTRODUCTION   
Alan David Freeman’s seminal article, “Legitimizing Ra-
cial Discrimination Through Antidiscrimination Law: A Criti-
cal Review of Supreme Court Doctrine,”1 provided a 
pathbreaking account of Supreme Court jurisprudence. The ar-
ticle laid bare a striking contradiction. The law promised racial 
equality, and indeed communicated that we had achieved such 
equality. Yet the actual circumstances in which non-white peo-
ple lived, worked, and attended school were in no way equal to 
the circumstances enjoyed by white people. In short, the law 
guaranteed equality while simultaneously rationalizing the on-
going existence of grievous inequality. 
According to Professor Freeman’s penetrating analysis, the 
law accomplished this rationalization in two ways. First, it 
promised formal equality. Second, it ignored structural inequal-
ity and disparities not obviously traceable to individual bad ac-
tors. As a result, the law provided a weak remedy for discrimi-
nation. Sometimes it provided no remedy at all. 
This Symposium Article will point out a related feature of 
antidiscrimination law that restricts equality despite the 
Court’s superficial dedication to equality. In keeping with Pro-
fessor Freeman’s work, my task is mostly descriptive, with a 
gesture at how we might improve upon the status quo. I first 
 
 † Associate Professor, University of Denver Sturm College of Law. I am 
grateful to Mario Barnes, Bob Chang, Jessica Clarke, Charlotte Garden, Lau-
ren Sudeall Lucas, Justin Pidot, the other participants in the Symposium 
commemorating the 100th anniversary of the Minnesota Law Review, and the 
editors of the Minnesota Law Review, especially Barbara Marchevsky, Rajin 
Olson, Emily Scholtes, Mary Scott, Christina Squiers, Taylor Stippel, Leah 
Tabbert, and Eleanor Wood. Copyright © 2016 by Nancy Leong.  
 1. Alan D. Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through Anti-
discrimination Law: A Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. 
REV. 1049 (1978). 
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recount antidiscrimination law’s inattention to the private—
and, at times, its explicit prioritization of a private “right” to 
discriminate over antidiscrimination values such as equality 
and dignity. 
The consequences of private discrimination are perhaps 
felt with most strength in the marketplace. Here, Congress has, 
in fact, provided a number of statutory mechanisms that could 
be used to combat private discrimination.2 Yet the Court has 
largely refused to acknowledge and remedy private discrimina-
tion that suppresses racial minorities’ participation in the mar-
ketplace. This inattention has extended conditions of economic 
inequality and the problems that attend them. 
On that note, I turn to a pressing issue of private discrimi-
nation today. Many have heralded the so-called “sharing econ-
omy,” which includes online or app-driven businesses such as 
Uber, Lyft, Airbnb, TaskRabbit, and Postmates, as a means to 
reduce discrimination.3 After all, some argue, it is difficult for a 
business to discriminate against someone on the basis of race 
when the parties are in different locations rather than face to 
face. But as I will show, certain features specific to the sharing 
economy actually increase the potential racial discrimination, 
both in a one-off encounter and over time. After enumerating 
the social science research supporting the existence and persis-
tence of discrimination in the sharing economy, I briefly con-
sider how various legal mechanisms might be reinterpreted to 
provide constructive solutions. 
I.  THE FAILINGS OF ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW   
“[A]s surely as the law has outlawed racial discrimination, 
it has affirmed that Black Americans can be without jobs, have 
their children in all-black, poorly funded schools, have no op-
portunities for decent housing, and have very little political 
 
 2. See infra Part II (examining federal statutes such as 42 U.S.C. § 1981 
(contracts); 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (housing); and several Titles of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964, including Title II (public accommodations), Title VI (funding), and 
Title VII (employment)). 
 3. This list is fluid and evolving. Businesses come and go quickly in the 
sharing economy. One such business, Homejoy, received a great deal of media 
attention before abruptly going out of business. See Ellen Huet, What Really 
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power, without any violation of antidiscrimination law.”4 So 
wrote Alan David Freeman in 1978. 
Since the publication of his seminal article, “Legitimizing 
Racial Discrimination Through Antidiscrimination Law: A 
Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine,” unfortunately too 
little has changed. When Professor Freeman wrote that “black 
children today have neither an affirmative right to receive an 
integrated education nor a right to equality of resources for 
their schools,”5 he could have been talking about the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Seattle School District No. 1.6 When he ex-
plained that people can “evade responsibility for ostensibly dis-
criminatory conduct by showing that the action was taken for a 
good reason, or for no reason at all,”7 he could have been speak-
ing about the discourse of police blamelessness for the deaths of 
black men and women that the Black Lives Matter movement8 
today struggles to address. And when he lamented the “political 
powerlessness”9 of black people, he could have been talking 
about a Fourth Amendment so emaciated that it now allows po-
lice officers to pull over suspects based on race without commit-
ting an “unreasonable” search or seizure.10 
In short, Professor Freeman provided a pathbreaking ac-
count of Supreme Court doctrine that—sadly—remains apt in 
many ways today. The article showed that, by ignoring struc-
tural inequality and disparities not obviously traceable to indi-
vidual bad actors, the law provides a weak remedy for discrim-
ination. And the Court is not alone in its refusal to 
acknowledge the lived realities of racial inequality. As many 
scholars have noted, the cheerful narrative of success in achiev-
 
 4. Freeman, supra note 1, at 1050. 
 5. Id. at 1068. 
 6. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 
701, 748 (2007) (invalidating two public school student apportionment plans 
that utilized race as a factor). 
 7. Freeman, supra note 1, at 1055 (footnote omitted). 
 8. See BLACK LIVES MATTER, http://www.blacklivesmatter.com (last vis-
ited Jan. 18, 2016) (providing news related to Black Lives Matter, a chapter-
based national organization dedicated to combatting anti-black racism). 
 9. Freeman, supra note 1, at 1080. 
 10. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996) (acknowledging 
that “the Constitution prohibits selective enforcement of the law based on con-
siderations such as race,” but nevertheless stating that “[s]ubjective intentions 
[of police officers] play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment 
analysis”). 
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ing formal equality presents a stark contrast to the entrenched 
racial inequality that remains to this day.11 
II.  PRIVATE FICTIONS   
Professor Freeman’s critique of the structural dimension of 
racial subordination extends readily to private discrimination. 
He says that formal equality will not produce equality on the 
ground. I agree, and say that, moreover, governmental efforts 
to produce equality on the ground will fall short unless they 
strive to reach the private sector and do so effectively. Creating 
lived equality requires the participation not only of the gov-
ernment, but also of the individuals it governs. 
Other critical legal theorists have observed that the dis-
tinction between public and private is in many ways illusory, or 
at least much less distinct than some would have us believe.12 
But even if the distinction between public and private were not 
intractably blurry, the effect of private discrimination shows 
that we cannot have a society that is equal along racial lines if 
the law is inattentive to private actors. 
The Supreme Court’s record is decidedly mixed when it 
comes to regulating private behavior as a precursor to creating 
conditions of equality. In The Civil Rights Cases,13 the Court 
held that in the Civil Rights Act of 1875 Congress exceeded its 
power under the Fourteenth Amendment when it stated that 
“[a]ll persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall 
be entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of the [public] ac-
commodations . . . subject only to the conditions . . . applicable 
alike to citizens of every race and color, regardless of any previ-
ous condition of servitude.”14 But it later held, in Heart of At-
lanta Motel v. United States15 and Katzenbaugh v. McClung,16 
 
 11. See, e.g., Robert S. Chang, Will LGBT Antidiscrimination Law Follow 
the Course of Race Antidiscrimination Law?, 100 MINN. L. REV. 1, 45 (2015) 
(noting that, while “formal equality” is achieved through race antidiscrimina-
tion laws, “discrimination and inequality persist”). 
 12. See, e.g., Duncan Kennedy, The Stages of the Decline of the Pub-
lic/Private Distinction, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1349, 1351–53 (1982); Paul Starr, 
The Meaning of Privatization, 6 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 6, 7 (1988). 
 13. 109 U.S. 3 (1883). 
 14. Id. at 9 (quoting the Civil Rights Act of 1875, 18 Stat. 335 (1875), in-
validated by The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 3). For a discussion of the 
Court’s decision, see RICHARD C. CORTNER, CIVIL RIGHTS AND PUBLIC ACCOM-
MODATIONS: THE HEART OF ATLANTA MOTEL AND MCCLUNG CASES 2–4 (2001). 
 15. 379 U.S. 241 (1964). 
 16. 379 U.S. 294 (1964). 
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that the Commerce Clause permitted Congress to regulate race 
discrimination by private actors,17 and three concurrences in 
the cases explored the possibility that the Fourteenth Amend-
ment did as well.18 In short, the Court has at times understood 
the importance of reaching private behavior as a precondition 
to equality and has at other times has looked the other way. 
Congressional history tells a similar story. As early as the 
Civil Rights Act of 1875, Congress attempted to reach private 
conduct, although as noted above for many decades that effort 
was limited by the Supreme Court. With the Reconstruction-
era civil rights statutes, Congress provided a remedy for dis-
crimination in contracts on the basis of race as well as for race-
based discrimination in housing.19 Several portions of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 also reach and prohibit discrimination on 
the basis of race by private actors. Title II forbids discrimina-
tion in places of “public accommodation.”20 Title VI prohibits 
discrimination by entities that accept federal funds.21 And Title 
VII outlaws discrimination in the workplace.22 
One noteworthy feature of such laws is that they do not all 
incorporate the intent requirement that the Supreme Court 
read into the Equal Protection Clause in Washington v. Davis.23 
For some laws, courts have read in a similar requirement—for 
example, “the vast majority of courts” has held that 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1981 requires a showing of intentional discrimination.24 But 
for those statutes that do not, such as Title VII,25 the party as-
 
 17. See Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 262; McClung, 379 U.S. at 
304–05. 
 18. See Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 278–79 (Black, J., concurring); 
id. at 279–83 (Douglas, J., concurring); id. at 292–93 (Goldberg, J., concur-
ring); see also CORTNER, supra note 14, at 179. 
 19. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2012) (contracts); 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (2012) (hous-
ing). In my view both statutes are highly underutilized by plaintiff’s attorneys, 
who could press upon the boundaries of conduct prohibited by the statutes. 
 20. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (2012). 
 21. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d–2000d-7. 
 22. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e. 
 23. 426 U.S. 229, 239–40 (1976). Washington v. Davis involved the equal 
protection “component” of the Fifth Amendment. Its holding was reaffirmed in 
the context of a Fourteenth Amendment equal protection claim in Village of 
Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 
264–66 (1977). 
 24. Glenn B. Manishin, Note, Section 1981: Discriminatory Purpose or 
Disproportionate Impact?, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 137, 138 (1980). For a discussion 
of the path that courts have taken, see id. at 137, 138–40, 138 n.11, 139 
nn.12–14 . 
 25. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429–30 (1971) (holding 
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serting racial discrimination need not show the existence of a 
bad actor—a perspective that Professor Freeman lamented in 
his work26—and instead must only show that the discrimination 
in fact occurred.27 On a superficial level, this is certainly an im-
provement upon the statutes for which courts have required a 
showing of discriminatory intent, although so many other fac-
tors lead to tepid enforcement that the consequences on the 
ground for the private sector have not been as robust as one 
might otherwise hope. 
Despite these efforts at implementing substantive equality 
within the private sector as well as the public, and the hopes 
that many advocates and scholars placed upon the statutes de-
signed to reach the private sector,28 and even the views ex-
pressed by some that the laws have in fact instantiated actual 
on-the-ground equality,29 the law has fallen short in many 
ways. Samuel Bagenstos notes that a zealous concern for indi-
vidual liberty has limited the effect of public accommodations 
statutes such as Title II.30 Anne-Marie Harris describes how 
despite 42 U.S.C. § 1981’s explicit protection of minority shop-
pers’ “right to contract on the same terms as white shoppers,”31 
 
that Title VII did not require a showing of intentional discrimination). Wash-
ington v. Davis left the Griggs rule undisturbed. See Washington, 426 U.S. at 
239. 
 26. See Freeman, supra note 1, at 1052–57. 
 27. There are, of course, differences among individual statutes. Moreover, 
we should remain mindful that each state also has various civil rights statutes 
in addition to the federal regime; these, too, sometimes hinge on particular 
mental states. 
 28. See, e.g., Theodore Eisenberg & Stewart Schwab, Comment, The Im-
portance of Section 1981, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 596, 603–04 (1988). 
 29. See Joseph William Singer, No Right To Exclude: Public Accommoda-
tions and Private Property, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1283, 1291 (1996) (asserting that 
there is a “settled social consensus” that public accommodations cannot ex-
clude patrons on the basis of race); see also Randall Kennedy, The Struggle for 
Racial Equality in Public Accommodations, in LEGACIES OF THE 1964 CIVIL 
RIGHTS ACT 156, 159 (Bernard Grofman ed., 2000) (“Although Title II was 
probably the most talked about section of the Civil Rights Act, the section 
about which emotions ran highest, the section over which the most blood had 
been spilled, it quickly faded in significance.”). 
 30. See Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Unrelenting Libertarian Challenge to 
Public Accommodations Law, 66 STAN. L. REV. 1205, 1207 (2014) (“Since the 
Reconstruction era, continuing through the civil rights era to today, public ac-
commodations laws have triggered legal controversy over the extent to which 
antidiscrimination principles should penetrate into spaces that had at one 
time been understood as ‘private’ or ‘social.’”). 
 31. Anne-Marie G. Harris, Shopping While Black: Applying 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1981 to Cases of Consumer Racial Profiling, 23 B.C. THIRD WORLD L. J. 1, 47 
(2003). 
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courts have failed to interpret the statute to prohibit even clear 
cut cases of consumer racial profiling,32 while Jeremy Bayless 
and Sophie Wang consider how the same issue inhibits en-
forcement of Title II’s prohibition on discrimination in public 
accommodations.33 Scholars have provided many other such ex-
amples.34 So even though we have statutes on the books that 
reach private racial discrimination, courts interpret those stat-
utes parsimoniously and private actors accordingly face no con-
sequences for behavior that in fact results in discrimination 
and, unsurprisingly, fail to alter their behavior. 
The dissonance Professor Freeman points out between the 
law’s claim of equality and the actual felt effects of discrimina-
tion exists with equal force in the private sector. Section 1982 
forbids housing discrimination, yet the foreclosure crisis of 
2010 disproportionately decimated poor black communities,35 
and 70% of black people in the city of Chicago still live in near-
ly all-black neighborhoods—a number that dropped only nine 
percentage points between 1990 and 2010.36 Title II forbids dis-
crimination by places of “public accommodation,” defined broad-
ly as “any inn, hotel, motel, or other establishment which pro-
vides lodging to transient guests . . . any restaurant, cafeteria, 
lunchroom, lunch counter, soda fountain, or other facility . . . 
any gasoline station . . . any motion picture house, theater, con-
cert hall, sports arena, stadium or other place of exhibition or 
entertainment” and other establishments that affect interstate 
 
 32. See id. at 55–56 (“Section 1981 currently protects consumers when 
merchants deny them access to their premises. Plaintiffs whose allegations fall 
short of complete denial of access, however, are usually unable to obtain com-
pensation under the statute.”). 
 33. See Jeremy D. Bayless & Sophie F. Wang, Racism on Aisle Two: A 
Survey of Federal and State Anti-discrimination Public Accommodation Laws, 
2 WM. & MARY POL’Y REV. 288, 288 (2011) (explaining the statutory protec-
tions offered to protect minorities in retail stores and noting that Title II of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides no protection to shoppers in retail establish-
ments). 
 34. See, e.g., Stephen E. Haydon, Comment, A Measure of Our Progress: 
Testing for Race Discrimination in Public Accommodations, 44 UCLA L. REV. 
1207, 1214–16 (1997) (discussing the persistence of discrimination in public 
accommodations); Abby Morrow Richardson, Note, Applying 42 U.S.C. § 1981 
to Claims of Consumer Discrimination, 39 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 119, 199 
(2005) (exploring judicial interpretation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 in cases involving 
discrimination in the context of consumer retail contracts). 
 35. See Jacob S. Rugh & Douglas S. Massey, Racial Segregation and the 
American Foreclosure Crisis, 75 AM. SOC. REV. 629, 630 (2010). 
 36. Dan Keating, Why Whites Don’t Understand Black Segregation, WASH. 
POST (Nov. 21, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonkblog/wp/ 
2014/11/21/why-whites-dont-understand-black-segregation. 
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commerce.37 Yet despite the sweeping language of Title II, 
many people of color still struggle to hail taxis and face hostili-
ty in restaurants.38 Title VII prohibits discrimination on the ba-
sis of race, yet workplace inequality remains: courts remain re-
sistant to claims of discrimination on the basis of functional 
proxies for racial identity such as attire, accent, and hairstyle.39 
The list could go on. 
In light of this duality—facial equality and functional ine-
quality—it is tempting to hope that non-legal mechanisms will 
provide a solution. Some people have hung their hopes on the 
sharing economy. 
III.  THE NEW PRIVATE DISCRIMINATION   
Much has been written over the past few years about the 
“sharing economy.” While there is no single authoritative defi-
nition of that economy, a definition cited with some frequency 
is that the sharing economy is a “socio-economic ecosystem” 
built around the shared creation, production, distribution, 
trade, and consumption of goods and services, that offers new 
ways of filling human needs as basic as housing and transpor-
tation.40 The success of businesses such as Uber and Lyft, which 
provide car services, or Airbnb, which offers housing rentals, 
shows how the sharing economy can make our lives easier and 
more efficient. One estimate predicts that the sharing economy 
will grow from $15 billion annual global revenue in 2013 to 
$335 billion in 2025.41 
Some people have hailed the sharing economy as a cure for 
race discrimination in the marketplace42—and in some instanc-
 
 37. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(a)–(c) (2012). 
 38. See Dan Harris & Gitika Ahuja, Race for a Cab: When Hailing a Ride 
Isn’t So Black and White, ABC NEWS (Apr. 1, 2009), http://www.abcnews 
.go.com/GMA/race-cab-hailing-ride-black-white/story?id=7223511. 
 39. See Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, Working Identity, 85 CORNELL 
L. REV. 1259, 1297–98 (2000); Camille Gear Rich, Performing Racial and Eth-
nic Identity: Discrimination by Proxy and the Future of Title VII, 79 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 1134, 1145–46 (2004). 
 40. Benita Matofska, What Is the Sharing Economy?, PEOPLE WHO 
SHARE, http://www.thepeoplewhoshare.com/blog/what-is-the-sharing-economy/ 
(last visited Mar. 21, 2016). 
 41. See John Hawksworth & Robert Vaughan, The Sharing Economy—
Sizing the Revenue Opportunity, PWC, http://www.pwc.co.uk/issues/ 
megatrends/collisions/sharingeconomy/the-sharing-economy-sizing-the 
-revenue-opportunity.html (last visited Feb. 11, 2016). 
 42. See Latoya Peterson, Cab Drivers, Uber, and the Costs of Racism, 
RACIALICIOUS (Nov. 28, 2012), http://www.racialicious.com/2012/11/28/cab 
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es it is. Latoya Peterson, noting longstanding discrimination 
against black people in transportation, describes an experience 
with Uber: 
The price made me gag, but the rest of the experience was flawless: I 
knew exactly when my car would arrive, I received a text when they 
reached my location, I gave them a location without quibbling, and 
rode there in peace.43 
The idea is that the Internet—by filtering out racial signi-
fiers—will eliminate the possibility of discrimination arising 
from overt or unconscious racism.44 An Uber driver who accepts 
a request to pick up a black person is bound to do so, while a 
taxi driver can simply drive past that person on the street. An 
Airbnb landlord who rents out her property to a black person 
over the Internet has obligated herself to complete the transac-
tion, while a landlord who first meets a prospective tenant in 
person may yet engage in discrimination.  
In many situations, sharing economy mechanisms may 
well improve upon their traditional analogues. But the mere 
existence of the sharing economy is not a panacea for race dis-
crimination. Rather, as we applaud the sharing economy’s 
marketplace innovations, we should also work to ensure that 
different yet equally problematic structures do not replicate 
and perpetuate age-old discrimination that continues to plague 
existing economic relationships. 
Existing research raises real concerns as to whether shar-
ing economy businesses ameliorate discrimination, or whether 
they actually worsen it.45 For example, some research has found 
that Airbnb—a company that allows property owners to make 
housing available for vacation or other short-term rentals—has 
been associated with facilitating both implicit and intentional 
unregulated discrimination.46 One study, for example, found 
 
-drivers-uber-and-the-costs-of-racism (stating that Uber “removes the racism 
factor when you need a ride”). 
 43. Id. 
 44. See id. 
 45. Nancy Leong & Aaron Belzer, The New Public Accommodations, 105 
GEO. L.J. (forthcoming 2017) (on file with author). 
 46. See Benjamin Edelman & Michael Luca, Digital Discrimination: The 
Case of Airbnb.com 3 (Harvard Bus. Sch., Working Paper No. 14-054, 2014), 
http://www.hbs.edu/faculty/Publication%20Files/Airbnb_92dd6086-6e46-4eaf 
-9cea-60fe5ba3c596.pdf. Scholars have also noted the problem. See, e.g., Mi-
chael Todisco, Share and Share Alike? Considering Racial Discrimination in 
the Nascent Room-Sharing Economy, 67 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 121, 121–22 
(2015), http://www.stanfordlawreview.org/sites/default/files/online/articles/67_ 
Stan_L_Rev_Online_121_Todisco.pdf (noting that Airbnb provides hosts with 
information about prospective guests that “serves as a heuristic for race,” 
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that “non-black hosts are able to charge approximately 12% 
more than black hosts, holding location, rental characteristics, 
and quality constant.”47 Uber and Lyft have also both faced ac-
cusations of discrimination on the basis of race,48 as well as on 
the basis of a proxy for race, by refusing to visit neighborhoods 
populated predominantly by people of color.49 How can this 
happen? Many sharing economy platforms offer opportunities 
for participants to create profiles that may reveal their race 
through a profile picture or a racially-coded name.50 As Michael 
Todisco explains, “[b]efore accepting or denying any request, 
Airbnb hosts are furnished with the guest’s first name, often a 
picture, and other personal information.”51 Thus, sharing econ-
omy businesses may not, in fact, filter out the effect of race. 
In addition to these instances of one-off discrimination, 
sharing economy businesses also employ rating systems that 
risk expression of implicit bias and even magnify its effects. 
Rating systems therefore instantiate the same inequality long 
present in the old economy.52 
An example will help to demonstrate the troubling effect of 
ratings on the normal course of business in much of the sharing 
economy. Consider Uber. Through a free, user-friendly smart 
phone app, Uber “not only stores data about its passengers, but 
also allows its drivers to rate passengers and makes the ratings 
 
which gives hosts “a nearly unfettered ability to decline potential guests” on 
the basis of race). 
 47. Edelman & Luca, supra note 46. 
 48. Xajaxsingerx, Ridesharing and Redlining: Uber, Lyft, Race and Class, 
DAILY KOS (May 27, 2014), http://www.dailykos.com/story/2014/5/27/1302417/ 
-Ridesharing-and-Redlining-Uber-Lyft-Race-and-Class. 
 49. While not the focus of this brief Article, discrimination on the basis of 
categories other than race is also possible: both Uber and Lyft have faced law-
suits for failure to provide services to the blind, disabled, and elderly. See Jen 
Wieczner, Why the Disabled Are Suing Uber and Lyft, FORTUNE (May 22, 
2015), http://fortune.com/2015/05/22/uber-lyft-disabled; Lucy Zemljic, Ride-
Sharing Firms Uber & Lyft Sued by 14 Connecticut Cab Companies, (May 24, 
2014), http://www.lowestrates.com/news/ride-sharing-firms-uber-lyft-sued-14 
-connecticut-cab-companies. 
 50. For a discussion of racially-coded names, see Angela Onwuachi-Willig 
& Mario L. Barnes, By Any Other Name?: On Being “Regarded As” Black, and 
Why Title VII Should Apply Even if Lakisha and Jamal Are White, 2005 WIS. 
L. REV. 1283. 
 51. Todisco, supra note 45, at 122. 
 52. Leong and Belzer, supra note 45; see also Noah Zatz, Is Uber Wagging 
the Dog With Its Moonlighting Drivers?, ONLABOR (Feb. 1, 2016), 
http://onlabor.org/2016/02/01/is-uber-wagging-the-dog-with-its-moonlighting 
-drivers/; Noah Zatz, Uber: A Platform for Discrimination, ONLABOR (Oct. 22, 
2015), http://onlabor.org/2015/10/22/uber-a-platform-for-discrimination/. 
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available to other drivers.”53 Yet this seemingly innocuous 
business model potentially facilitates discrimination in several 
ways. 
Most obviously, drivers’ and passengers’ ratings of one an-
other may be influenced by express or implicit racial bias. Such 
bias may affect their interactions during individual encounters. 
But the insidious potential of the app is that it aggregates 
these ratings over many interactions. One possible result is 
that when a driver considers whether to pick up a passenger he 
may decide not to if she has a bad rating. Another possibility is 
that a passenger may notice a driver’s poor rating, cancel a re-
quest for service, and try again in a few moments in the hopes 
of getting picked up by someone else. If the driver and the pas-
senger do end up in the same car, a marginal rating may prime 
one or both individuals to perceive one another in negative 
ways. For example, if a driver knows that a passenger has a 
relatively low rating, he may be more inclined to interpret in-
nocuous behavior (declining to remove headphones, disinclina-
tion to engage in small talk) as unfriendly and to punish the 
passenger with a poor rating. 
Throughout the interaction, the format of the app itself 
prompts and amplifies discrimination. Passengers upload pho-
tos when they sign up for the service54—although it is unclear 
exactly how the photos are used, Uber’s website makes clear 
that they might be provided to the driver. Moreover, the app 
provides the driver and passenger with one another’s names, 
which are often correlated with race.55 Even absent the prime of 
a low rating, the prime of racially identifying information asso-
ciated with the driver or passenger through the app may color 
the subsequent interaction. 
The fact that drivers for Uber or Lyft may be using this 
rating information to decide whether or not to pick someone up 
is concerning at best.56 And the lack of transparency creates a 
greater concern: although it is possible to call and learn your 
customer rating, the cause of the rating remains unclear. 
True, some checks on such discrimination may “reduce ra-
cial profiling and destination bias”: Uber claims to require its 
 
 53. Nancy Leong, Uber, Privacy, and Discrimination, RIGHTSBLOG (Apr. 
20, 2014), http://www.nancyleong.com/race-2/uber-privacy-discrimination. 
 54. See Update My Profile Photo, UBER, http://help.uber.com/h/15726fa5 
-152f-468c-a42c-ad63315b58ef (last visited Feb. 11, 2016). 
 55. Barnes and Onwuachi-Willig, supra, note 50. 
 56. See id.  
  
2164 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [100:2153 
 
drivers to accept 90% of all requests, and Lyft drivers are una-
ble to see the destination request until they have picked up the 
passenger.57 But these tools are at best very crudely calibrated 
to the entrenched problem of race discrimination. 
Nevertheless, one concern is that the way that sharing 
economy businesses use customer data can facilitate discrimi-
nation.58 For example, how is someone supposed to know 
whether her Uber profile will be used by a driver to either in-
tentionally or unconsciously discriminate against her, either in 
deciding whether to pick her up or deciding what rating to 
award her?59 Because such information is hidden from the pub-
lic, the common assertion that sharing economy businesses are 
less discriminatory is not actually subject to any sort of exter-
nal verification. 
Without more information and analysis on the ways these 
ratings are being used in everyday business, it is difficult to 
prove the exact effect of the rating systems. For that reason, 
“[t]hese kinds of private scoring systems are prone to abuse if 
companies don’t publicize them or make the ratings sufficiently 
transparent,” especially when one does not have easy access to 
one’s score or the ability to improve one’s score by learning 
from experience.60 As Professor Tim Iglesias has explained: “If 
the primary intention of Airbnb, Uber, Lyft and other new 
companies is really to help people,” they should “incorporate as 
nonprofits and state their public purposes clearly so that they 
can be held accountable to them.”61 While ratings often make 
potential customers’ decisions easier and establish a business’s 
reputation, as the rating system stands now, the systems of 
companies like Uber are susceptible to abuse.62 
 
 57. Johana Bhuiyan, Uber and Lyft Position Themselves as Relief from 
Discrimination, BUZZFEED NEWS (Oct. 7, 2014), http://www.buzzfeed.com/ 
johanabhuiyan/app-based-car-services-may-reduce-discrimination-issues.  
 58. See Leong, supra note 53.  
 59. See id.  
 60. G.S. Hans, Are You a Two-Star Passenger? The Problem with Uber’s 
Hidden Customer Rating System, CTR. FOR DEMOCRACY & TECH. (July 29, 
2014), https://cdt.org/blog/are-you-a-two-star-passenger-the-problem-with 
-ubers-hidden-customer-rating-system. 
 61. Greg Harman, The Sharing Economy Is Not As Open As You Might 
Think, GUARDIAN (Nov. 12, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/  
sustainable-business/2014/nov/12/algorithms-race-discrimination-uber-lyft 
-airbnb-peer.  
 62. See David Mandell, Can the Sharing Economy End Discrimination?, 
FAST COMPANY (Aug. 8, 2014), http://www.fastcompany.com/3034112/the 
-future-of-work/can-the-sharing-economy-end-discrimination.  
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If users demonstrated that such abuse took place, however, 
several existing civil rights statutes should apply to Uber’s dis-
crimination. Under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, the company should be 
found to have engaged in discrimination in making contracts. 
Uber is almost certainly a public accommodation,63 and should 
thus be subject to the reach of Title II. And if passengers also 
discriminate against drivers with poorer ratings, Uber might 
well be liable under Title VII for constructing a rating system 
that facilitates such discrimination. 
Whether these statutes will be applied in this manner to 
the sharing economy, however, is also up for debate. The prob-
lem is less with the existing laws and more with the way that 
courts apply them and the evidentiary hurdles that race dis-
crimination plaintiffs must overcome before they are believed. I 
think that Professor Freeman would have predicted as much. 
  CONCLUSION   
What is to be done about discrimination in the age of the 
sharing economy? First and most importantly, we must heed 
Professor Freeman’s words, which remain timely across the 
decades. We must beware of rationalization—of explaining 
away disparate effects on members of different racial groups—
and of the false promise of facially neutral systems. 
Professor Freeman is very hard on the existing law. So am 
I. But there are solutions if we are willing to embrace them. 
Perhaps most obviously, courts can interpret existing federal 
civil rights statutes more boldly, bringing regulation of the pri-
vate sector better in line with true equality rather than its 
weaker formal cousin. There may also be a role for more robust 
enforcement of state civil rights statutes regulating the private 
sector. Many such statutes are written more expansively than 
their federal analogs, and state courts may be more willing to 
enforce those statutes aggressively. And with the new intrica-
 
 63. While the issue is not settled in the courts, several commentators have 
agreed that taxis are public accommodations, and Uber is closely analogous to 
a taxi service. See, e.g., Sylvia A. Law, White Privilege and Affirmative Action, 
32 AKRON L. REV. 603, 605–06, 606 n.12 (1999) (“Since . . . Congress passed 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, it has been illegal for common carriers, including 
taxis to discriminate on the basis of race.”); Peter Siegelman, Racial Discrimi-
nation in “Everyday” Commercial Transactions: What Do We Know, What Do 
We Need To Know, and How Can We Find Out?, in A NATIONAL REPORT CARD 
ON DISCRIMINATION IN AMERICA: THE ROLE OF TESTING 70 (Michael Fix & 
Margery Austin Turner eds., 1998) (referring to “hailing a taxicab” as a “public 
accommodation”). 
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cies of the sharing economy, legislatures at both the state and 
federal level should move proactively to address some of the po-
tential problems I have described here. For example, as I de-
scribe in more detail elsewhere,64 statutes could require collec-
tion and public disclosure of racial usage data by sharing 
economy businesses—not unlike the way the Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission requires collection of such data 
by employers to ensure compliance with Title VII. Such manda-
tory disclosure would serve multiple functions: it would make 
clear when racial disparities exist; it would provide important 
evidence in the event of litigation under existing statutes; and, 
perhaps most importantly, it would provide sharing economy 
businesses with an incentive to correct racial disparities rather 
than face negative publicity in the wake of disclosures reveal-
ing such disparities. 
 
 
 64. See Leong and Belzer, supra note 45. 
